Chapter Six: Perman and Taylor/Chapter Eleven: M&H (Why They Fought)
I thought to combine these readings because they inform one another as to the various reasons why volunteer soldiers fought in a war which would end later than most people predicted. There is so much information available through primary articles, diaries, and letters, that modern readers get a clear picture of the many reasons soldiers from the North and South sought to defend their cause. For some on both sides, it was patriotism. Though both sides differed as to what our forefathers meant when they invoked liberty, each side was certain they were upholding the original principals of 1776. For some Southerners, the fight was about subjugation, states rights, protecting slavery, property, self-government, honor, and/or duty. For some Northerners, the fight was about "the need to destroy slavery" (P&T, p. 178), duty, honor, Union rights, brotherhood, the need for the survival of a republican governement, and so on. No matter why they fought, Perman and Taylor's letters from men on both sides leave no doubt that the war had a huge impact on the men's pschological and physical well-being. Periods of no fighting were boring or intolerable, the men's morale hung in the balance, too many questions were unanswered (what was to be done with escaped slaves, for example), and both sides seemingly seperated race from slavery. Some Northerners echoed the sentiments of the Southerners, in that they cared less about what happened to the slaves than themselves. All of the letters are filled with a mixture of war words, hope, dread, longing, confusion, and doubt. One letter, written by Tally Simpson from the CSA, could have well been written by a Northerner when he states that the Battle at Vicksburg has caused him to "lose confidence in something or somebody, I can't say which." This was striking because every loss meant that the loss of confidence in the war itself, the men who led, and/or the privates fighting to make gains.
The Essays
Dean's essay on Confederate soldier enlistment patterns in Va. also informed my understanding of McPherson and Hogue's discussion on enlistment. In Va., for example, two party politics divided a state into Pro-Confederacy or Pro-Union. Geographical and industrial limitations or advantages like railroads and waterways were important stategically because they could be used to "strike" in those "vital" areas (M&H, p. 175). Dean's essay on enlistment of soldiers highlights each region's importance and high rate of enlistment "across a diverse array of communities in spite of the sharp regional divisions that had prevailed before the war" (P&T, p. 189). Here, Dean gives us the idea that pro-slavery conscription was highest in areas where there was a profit to be made. He goes on to illustrate the reason for secession, including ideology, religion, socio-economic status, and honor/shame culture. Both slaveholders and non-slaveholders in Va. enjoyed a certain status which they intended to keep/fight for, "hence, defending Virginia in 1860 was defending slavery" (p. 195). Rhetoric complicated and "prolonged" the war further, as "proslavery propagandists" framed arguments abstractly (p. 196). Enlistment patterns here speak loudly as to the real reasons folks volunteered for the war, not only in Va. but in the deep South as well.
Chandra Manning's essay on White Union Soldiers and their ideas about race and slavery was also eye-opening, to say the least. Here, she maintains that some Union soldiers were anti-slavery only because they wanted to "end the institution that they identified as the root cause of the conflict" (P&T, p. 199). Views on slavery ranged greatly, and as the author confirms, and it is difficult to know why because so many fought on the Union side and disagreed about almost everything (P&T, p. 200). However, research indicates that the earliest reasons had to do with protecting the republican governement. far from abolitionists, Union soldiers began to understand that the the peculiar institution that caused the war was also the one which needed to be abolished in order to end the war (P&T, p. 202). If any reader has romanticized notions about the North, Manning dispels them in her use of the soldier's own words. However, some (such as the Chaplain she quotes on p. 202) saw the folly of slavery in terms of class status and gender. I was also happy to read that popular literature also helped the abolitionist's cause. For one moment, I could not help cast aside the hat of historian for that of mother, and wept when I read about the inhumanity (p. 203) Webber encountered when he and friends met a boy whose "shoulders were black and blue" and couldn't raise his arm. No wonder, when confronted with such scenes, some (like Webber) could not turn away from the cruelty of slavery. manning writes that slavery "violated family rights" as well as other "sacred ideals" (p. 203). This happened with African-american soldier enlistment as well; Pro-union soldiers began to understand that black men could fight alongside and as well as they could. Of course, it was but a small change, since it did not mean soldiers were going to fight for racial equality or rights. Her ending is also a fitting explanation for "the aftermath of reconstruction," in which there was "a vast potential for racial change" which was unfullfilled (p. 209).
McPherson and Hogue (Chapters 10-13)
Chapter 10, as discussed earlier, was more than about geographical and regional differnces; it is discussed in the book as a "Brother's War" where whole families were divided between the North and the South. People who lived in the border states fought neighbor against neighbor, brother against brother. Public proclamations by Lincoln, disregard for orders and lack of supplies were only some of the problems faced by these states. Chapter 11 discusses the organization of the forces and the navies. Confederate navies were only well-versed in their waterways but lacked the knowledge of the sea and supplies (ships, ship engines) produced in the North. They may have had West Point graduates, but the North's Navy was in better shape. No one, as mentioned, thought the war would be long, except for Sherman. Tragic mix-ups with uniforms and lack/quality of supplies further plagued each side p. 181).
The sub-section on army organization was helpful because it included a diagram together with examples of what soldiers in each division did. There were so many casualites, that most companies were reduced to only fractions of their original numbers. The discussion on professionals vs. nonprofessionals was vital to understanding fractions within same regiments. Finally, the discussion on blockades showed that the South was crippled in some ways by "cargo" that would have "gotten through had there been no blockade" (p. 198). Chapter Twelve, "The Balance Sheet of War," gives the reader a glimpse as to how each side financed this expensive war. conscription began to suffer as morale declined, but was crucial to the South because without a draft, the South would have lost sooner (p. 203). A good point M&H make on page 204 was that the South only needed to defend from, not invade, the North. In other words, the burden of proof was on the North, The South knew their terrain better and maps of such areas were scarce for the Union. M&H also write about guerillas and state that less than 10,000 men served as such. Violence increased greatly because of guerillas - not a romantic notion! The Confederacy seemed in as bad shape financially as the North, although the North created "Greenbacks" or teasury notes to help finance the war along with War Bonds. Chapter 13 treats the topic of the war from both the homefront and abroad in Europe. The first Battle of Bull run was a bumbled success for the Union, in which Jackson was killed and the popular legend arose. Lincoln ordered them to attack even though they were "green," which caused elays and confusion among the troops. Spies foiled some of the plans and confusion about uniforms caused crippling of Union attacks (p. 229). Later, this battle became an expensive, "tactical victory for the Confederacy" (p. 230). This caused the South to think the war had been won, but McClellan came into the Union picture to organize what was left of the army. However, his ego large and his tendency to not act when important placed him in a tight spot for all the adulation he received. Equally, he wanted to dodge the question of "the Negro" and saw the war as a need to keep "the integrity" of the Union (p. 236). Last, I was surprised to learn that the Confederacy did not elicit help from other nations, as they thought previously would occur. There were several reasons for this, but the biggest seemd to be national self-interest, not ideology or politics (p. 238). The South thought blockading cotton from GB would enlist their help, but they were wrong because the Brits developed alternative solutions and would not be economically blackmailed (p. 239). The last topic, The Trent Affair, was the only skirmish between GB and the Union, but ended in a check-mate of sorts as either side realized one war was enough for the moment.
Tuesday, September 27, 2011
Tuesday, September 20, 2011
Alexander Stephens & Abraham Lincoln
Alexander H. Stephens, Confederate VP
As I read this week's selections, I really became excited. The reason for that is, I think, that both selections put me in that historical moment, as though I was a spectator because they were so powerful. As such, these men realized the gravity of the situation. For example, Stephens calls it being "in the midst of one of the greatest epochs" and one of the "greatest revolutions in the annals of the world" (M&H, A13).
However, where some speeches by other Southerners held out hope or weren't as direct, Stephens drew the line clearly and his point was direct. That is, the South was seceding (as Dew asserts) because of slavery. Here, he insists that our forefathers (Jefferson et al) were "fundamentally wrong," in their principles of equality and that slavery is correct. In other words, he felt African Americans were unequal to whites. He received applause for this, but I noted something else - his speech seemed desperate to me. When he says that our forefathers erroneously felt the institution was "evanescent" and that "Providence" would rid us of this blight called slavery (my words), he and others were worried so much that it was so, that secession was the inevitable slippery slope.
He went on to use science, fanaticism and racial premises to convince drive his point home, even calling it a "species of insanity" to be anti-slavery. He really thought "The Creator" had made the races unequal. Stephens unknowingly predicted the South's fate with an anecdote from the opposition but in the end, stated that it was the North, not the South, who were "warring against a principle." Sad for humanity, for the slaves, for the U.S., and for all those who died in the cause on both sides.
Abraham Lincoln's "Proclamation Calling Militia and Convening Congress"
In this Proclamation, I found the President had no choice but to be determined and politically forceful at this point. It was a month after Lincoln was elected and less than three weeks after Stephens' speech; physical presence of the military was needed to the tune of 75,000 (according to his speech). This was basically an order to protect and uphold the law via the militia, with Congress convening until the fourth of July.
Here, he powerfully appeals to/threatens both seceded states and citizens to be peaceable and gives them twenty days from that date to do as ordered. He asks the forces too to "repossess" all property including forts, etc. but to do so without "devastation" or "destruction." For me, he turns the tide from being diplomatic at the onset to letting them know who's boss. Lincoln does not want bloodshed, but he does what a Commander-In-Chief should do (uphold the law, especially because he believes in Providence). The Proclamation is short, clear and determined. War is here. It is indeed an "extraordinary occasion" (A15).
As I read this week's selections, I really became excited. The reason for that is, I think, that both selections put me in that historical moment, as though I was a spectator because they were so powerful. As such, these men realized the gravity of the situation. For example, Stephens calls it being "in the midst of one of the greatest epochs" and one of the "greatest revolutions in the annals of the world" (M&H, A13).
However, where some speeches by other Southerners held out hope or weren't as direct, Stephens drew the line clearly and his point was direct. That is, the South was seceding (as Dew asserts) because of slavery. Here, he insists that our forefathers (Jefferson et al) were "fundamentally wrong," in their principles of equality and that slavery is correct. In other words, he felt African Americans were unequal to whites. He received applause for this, but I noted something else - his speech seemed desperate to me. When he says that our forefathers erroneously felt the institution was "evanescent" and that "Providence" would rid us of this blight called slavery (my words), he and others were worried so much that it was so, that secession was the inevitable slippery slope.
He went on to use science, fanaticism and racial premises to convince drive his point home, even calling it a "species of insanity" to be anti-slavery. He really thought "The Creator" had made the races unequal. Stephens unknowingly predicted the South's fate with an anecdote from the opposition but in the end, stated that it was the North, not the South, who were "warring against a principle." Sad for humanity, for the slaves, for the U.S., and for all those who died in the cause on both sides.
Abraham Lincoln's "Proclamation Calling Militia and Convening Congress"
In this Proclamation, I found the President had no choice but to be determined and politically forceful at this point. It was a month after Lincoln was elected and less than three weeks after Stephens' speech; physical presence of the military was needed to the tune of 75,000 (according to his speech). This was basically an order to protect and uphold the law via the militia, with Congress convening until the fourth of July.
Here, he powerfully appeals to/threatens both seceded states and citizens to be peaceable and gives them twenty days from that date to do as ordered. He asks the forces too to "repossess" all property including forts, etc. but to do so without "devastation" or "destruction." For me, he turns the tide from being diplomatic at the onset to letting them know who's boss. Lincoln does not want bloodshed, but he does what a Commander-In-Chief should do (uphold the law, especially because he believes in Providence). The Proclamation is short, clear and determined. War is here. It is indeed an "extraordinary occasion" (A15).
Tuesday, September 13, 2011
Perman & Taylor Readings and Dew's Apostles of Disunion
The more I read, the more I realize I know little to nothing (no pun intended) about the North and South's reasons for Union/secession. More explicitly, my view was based on movies I saw or subjects quickly studied in high school rather than the varied views of scholarship deftly presented in essays/documents such as Perman and Taylor's or books written like that of Dew's Apostles of Disunion.
Perman & Taylor readings
Sheepish disclaimer aside, Chapter Four's "Sectionalism and Secession" helped me to understand what sectionalism meant in both the modern and periodic sense and what the impetus behind secession was. Regarding the two documents by Emerson and Lincoln, it is obvious that Sumner's caning horrified the North, and its' accompanying images were certainly used in speeches to highlight the South's "barbaric" nature. I noted that the whipping of a slave was not mentioned in these documents (although perhaps in other primary, abolitionist sources) as barbaric. A few years later, Lincoln addresses accusations of the North's sectionalism and says it is really the South who is sectional. (It isn't lost on me that he writes like the lawyer he was :). Moreover, he turns the South's arguments and what they are in favor of on them by writing that they are the ones who are not acting according to the Founding Father's precepts.
The last three documents by Southerners written during the secession crisis, illustrate that they too, had blame to throw at the North, and felt justified in seceding. Of course, as Dew mentions, one cannot set aside that the South was primarily concerned about slavery itself. In all the documents, strong language in words like "madcaps," "totally revolutionized," "ignorant, inferior, barbarian," etc. leave no doubt where each stood. For instance, Harris' address to the Georgia assembly, which also appears in Dew, is plain language which is plain sad (as Dew has also asserted in his introduction). Yet, I tried to read the aforementioned articles in a way that would showed me how scared each side was because of the slippery slope leading to the inevitable - secession, then war - following Lincoln's election. Although the first Southern justification articles are forceful, Stephens seemed a little less so; "We will be the architect of our own fortunes," and even though he feels Northerners are "fanatics," one can't help but feel some hesitation on his behalf about secession.
The pair of essays by Grant and Sinha left me with mixed feelings, although they seemed to speak to one another. Grant's essay shows a different side of the same coin in that she examines what she views as the North's sectionalism and some of the ideology she feels fanned the flames of secession. For example, she points out that the North wasn't nationalistic because they had "anti-southern" views and that the North saw the South as "posing a threat" to their way of life. To her, How is not as important as why. That is, she maintains the North's support of "all things Northern" and their claim of nationalism was truly sectional and politically calculated/motivated. Grant makes some concessions, but in the end, she writes that the North was not unified and that "Opposition to the South was a more viable cohesive force ... than was opposition to a threat an ocean away." On page 117, she makes a definitive point that the North was "too" everything to allow "national development" which had both parties interests. I hope I did justice to her essay, as there were so many interesting points in it. By contrast, Sinha's article on South Carolina planters presents the view that they were politically motivated to keep a "separatist" ideology which favored few and "defended bound labor," but was not democratic in nature. Her essay is almost completely differs from Grant's in that she sees no democratic values in the South. She also writes that a distinct ideology, not "broad republican principles" was the reason for disunion in South Carolina (p. 123). Later in the essay, she says that Leonidas Spratt "has been strangely neglected" by scholars of "pro-slavery thought," which I found to be untrue as I read Dew's book, which dedicates at least three or more pages to him and his address to the South. I did wonder if Spratt was considered a radical in his day?, as he was for the African slave trade. Both essays address religion as an inextricable part of the secession equation, although Sinha includes gender as well.
Apostles of Disunion by Charles Dew
Appearances are def. deceiving in Dew's slim volume! I thought it was brave of him to introduce this book in both a scholarly and personal way. His introduction is not to be missed because as a son of the South, he lets the reader know how primary documents in history made him question Southern pride and what the causes of the Civil War were beyond what he learned growing up. Though his intro. is short, it is the Commissioner's own voices in letters and speeches he uses to tell the story of why the South felt secession was necessary after Lincoln's election. I didn't even know that Southerners had commissioners of this sort because it is not usually taught in history courses. Mainly, the trend seems to be to read Harriet B. Stowe, discuss major leaders like Lincoln, or discuss slavery as evil without showing how we got that far. The commissioners were more like henchmen who took their jobs seriuosly without regard (more or less) to war's consequences. No one thougght the war would last as long as it did and with so many casualties on both sides. This book fully engaged me in understanding their roles (especially that of South Carolina, Virginia, and Alabama) and why the war was shortly to follow. Some Southerners were reluctant, while others were adamant and used language that stings especially modern readers and historians alike.
Dew's conclusion firmly asserts that these "Apostles of Disunion" were also "Apostles of Racism." Additionally, he gives three reasons why the South felt threatened, all amounting to apocalyptic scenarios for the white man. One was (he writes) social inequality, two was the possibilty of a "race war," and three was "racial amalgation" (Dew, 77-79). That is, the author sees these reasons not as political discussions but as arguements sometimes slyly, sometimes unapologetically, sometimes brutally cloaked as rhetoric (and violent canings, at times) in the justification for secession. The men, Dew writes, were "untroubled" by "illogical inconsistencies". Any good historian would do just what Dew did: present the facts and let history speak for itself. Any group that cannot see slavery as a major underpinning of the Civil War has not read these documents extensively or chooses to ignore the facts that race and hierarchy, not political affiliations and national pride, caused the inevitable. A history ignored is one that, unfortunately, tends to repeat itself in this and other ways. It should be required reading in high school history courses!
Perman & Taylor readings
Sheepish disclaimer aside, Chapter Four's "Sectionalism and Secession" helped me to understand what sectionalism meant in both the modern and periodic sense and what the impetus behind secession was. Regarding the two documents by Emerson and Lincoln, it is obvious that Sumner's caning horrified the North, and its' accompanying images were certainly used in speeches to highlight the South's "barbaric" nature. I noted that the whipping of a slave was not mentioned in these documents (although perhaps in other primary, abolitionist sources) as barbaric. A few years later, Lincoln addresses accusations of the North's sectionalism and says it is really the South who is sectional. (It isn't lost on me that he writes like the lawyer he was :). Moreover, he turns the South's arguments and what they are in favor of on them by writing that they are the ones who are not acting according to the Founding Father's precepts.
The last three documents by Southerners written during the secession crisis, illustrate that they too, had blame to throw at the North, and felt justified in seceding. Of course, as Dew mentions, one cannot set aside that the South was primarily concerned about slavery itself. In all the documents, strong language in words like "madcaps," "totally revolutionized," "ignorant, inferior, barbarian," etc. leave no doubt where each stood. For instance, Harris' address to the Georgia assembly, which also appears in Dew, is plain language which is plain sad (as Dew has also asserted in his introduction). Yet, I tried to read the aforementioned articles in a way that would showed me how scared each side was because of the slippery slope leading to the inevitable - secession, then war - following Lincoln's election. Although the first Southern justification articles are forceful, Stephens seemed a little less so; "We will be the architect of our own fortunes," and even though he feels Northerners are "fanatics," one can't help but feel some hesitation on his behalf about secession.
The pair of essays by Grant and Sinha left me with mixed feelings, although they seemed to speak to one another. Grant's essay shows a different side of the same coin in that she examines what she views as the North's sectionalism and some of the ideology she feels fanned the flames of secession. For example, she points out that the North wasn't nationalistic because they had "anti-southern" views and that the North saw the South as "posing a threat" to their way of life. To her, How is not as important as why. That is, she maintains the North's support of "all things Northern" and their claim of nationalism was truly sectional and politically calculated/motivated. Grant makes some concessions, but in the end, she writes that the North was not unified and that "Opposition to the South was a more viable cohesive force ... than was opposition to a threat an ocean away." On page 117, she makes a definitive point that the North was "too" everything to allow "national development" which had both parties interests. I hope I did justice to her essay, as there were so many interesting points in it. By contrast, Sinha's article on South Carolina planters presents the view that they were politically motivated to keep a "separatist" ideology which favored few and "defended bound labor," but was not democratic in nature. Her essay is almost completely differs from Grant's in that she sees no democratic values in the South. She also writes that a distinct ideology, not "broad republican principles" was the reason for disunion in South Carolina (p. 123). Later in the essay, she says that Leonidas Spratt "has been strangely neglected" by scholars of "pro-slavery thought," which I found to be untrue as I read Dew's book, which dedicates at least three or more pages to him and his address to the South. I did wonder if Spratt was considered a radical in his day?, as he was for the African slave trade. Both essays address religion as an inextricable part of the secession equation, although Sinha includes gender as well.
Apostles of Disunion by Charles Dew
Appearances are def. deceiving in Dew's slim volume! I thought it was brave of him to introduce this book in both a scholarly and personal way. His introduction is not to be missed because as a son of the South, he lets the reader know how primary documents in history made him question Southern pride and what the causes of the Civil War were beyond what he learned growing up. Though his intro. is short, it is the Commissioner's own voices in letters and speeches he uses to tell the story of why the South felt secession was necessary after Lincoln's election. I didn't even know that Southerners had commissioners of this sort because it is not usually taught in history courses. Mainly, the trend seems to be to read Harriet B. Stowe, discuss major leaders like Lincoln, or discuss slavery as evil without showing how we got that far. The commissioners were more like henchmen who took their jobs seriuosly without regard (more or less) to war's consequences. No one thougght the war would last as long as it did and with so many casualties on both sides. This book fully engaged me in understanding their roles (especially that of South Carolina, Virginia, and Alabama) and why the war was shortly to follow. Some Southerners were reluctant, while others were adamant and used language that stings especially modern readers and historians alike.
Dew's conclusion firmly asserts that these "Apostles of Disunion" were also "Apostles of Racism." Additionally, he gives three reasons why the South felt threatened, all amounting to apocalyptic scenarios for the white man. One was (he writes) social inequality, two was the possibilty of a "race war," and three was "racial amalgation" (Dew, 77-79). That is, the author sees these reasons not as political discussions but as arguements sometimes slyly, sometimes unapologetically, sometimes brutally cloaked as rhetoric (and violent canings, at times) in the justification for secession. The men, Dew writes, were "untroubled" by "illogical inconsistencies". Any good historian would do just what Dew did: present the facts and let history speak for itself. Any group that cannot see slavery as a major underpinning of the Civil War has not read these documents extensively or chooses to ignore the facts that race and hierarchy, not political affiliations and national pride, caused the inevitable. A history ignored is one that, unfortunately, tends to repeat itself in this and other ways. It should be required reading in high school history courses!
Tuesday, September 6, 2011
Perman & Taylor Readings, Schwalm's Hard Fight... excerpt
Regarding "Documents" (Perman & Taylor)
When I finished reading each of the four documents, it became more obvious that each side stridently believed in the cause for which they argued. These primary documents offer a glimpse into why the war was so inevitable. Olmstead, for example, writes that Southerners call themselves gentlemen (p.31), but are hypocritical and not open-minded. Further, Helper matter-of-factly refers to the Southerner as backward, using statistics and other rhetoric to 'prove' that the South is backwards. Both documents point to the fact that slavery is evil and that Southerners must stop their "continual blushing" by sanctifying slavery while pointing to their agricultural superiority as the main need for it.
Hammond and Fitzhugh, on the other hand, defend the South and even make claims that the South is superior. Of course, both sides felt that the "Creator" is with them. However, the latter documents accuse the North of fake piety, of exaggerated claims of riots, etcetera. Here, the North is seen as a "wolf" (p. 34) who preys on the tranquility of the South. I laughed when I read that the only thing causing a mob in the South is an abolitionist, though I doubt it to be wholly true (p. 34). However, the idyllic picture Fitzhugh paints was only in terms of whites, not inclusive of the slaves who raised the South up (literally) on their backs. Yet, one can feel the passion in which they argue the South's cause.
Debow's documents circles the debate utilizing Southern non-slaveholders in his attempt to persuade them to support slavery. Here, he outlines five reasons using economic profit as his basis for supporting slavery. I was surprised (but should not have been) when he refers to slaves as commodities which produce human capital in reason four. This is important, as Schwalm maintains, because women were both productive in slavery and their reproductive capabilities made them assets to the Southerner.
Documents six and seven give opposing views of abolitionists, which furthered my understanding of each side's viewpoints. The rhetoric abolitionists used was impressive because they loaded journals with words such as "man-stealer," "social crime," "merchandise," etc. together with religion to convince that slave-holding is really "heathenism" disguised as other things (p. 38/39). If abolitionists exposed slavery for what it was, Southerners claimed abolitionists themselves were the cause of slaves suffering. Their writings, too, must have convinced many that the South's cause was justified; that indeed, abolitionists were meddlers. That is, he writes that most masters were benevolent!, but that abolitionists' caused masters to sell slaves to "hard-hearted" traders, thereby "increasing the suffering" of slaves (p. 40). The propaganda seen the collective arguements offer many reasons for each side's cause, but the one thing shared was that slavery was the underpinning of all arguements between the N/S.
The last two essays (written by modern historians) offer new ways of looking at the same issue. McPherson's essay shows the flaws in past/present scholarship by questioning how different/similar the South and North were, concluding that although there was a dichotomy, the South was most similar to other European countries. Deyle's essay focused more on how the slave trade entrenched each side in their differences. I enjoyed how each scholar deeply researched his point, and although the essays were different, each points to the glaring, unavoidable fact that the North and the South were dissimilar.It seems that war was inescaple the more time wore on and states were added.
Last but Not Least...A Hard Fight for We
Although I learned so much more than I thought possible via these primary documents, the focus in Schwalm's Hard Fight on gender in lowland rice plantations left me speechless. Turning page after page, the attention given to South Carolina's female slaves, their roles in the slave & white community, and so forth was phenomenal in its' scholarship and left me wondering how much of this has been previously "ignored" or glossed over by past scholars. If we are to be historians, we cannot ignore that social and reproductive labor contributed to/were the heart of those plantations. There were facts most people do not know (overseers, not just owners of plantations, routinely abused these women) and facts that have been passed up in history (the significance, for example, of their roles on/off the fields). I also appreciated the explication of what the work entailed and its' technical aspects (one could almost "see" the conditions under which they labored & the instruments used in which seasons). Schwalm's book fills-in-the-blanks of a time and gender which has previously been a postscript, at best. I cannot wait to write about this book!
When I finished reading each of the four documents, it became more obvious that each side stridently believed in the cause for which they argued. These primary documents offer a glimpse into why the war was so inevitable. Olmstead, for example, writes that Southerners call themselves gentlemen (p.31), but are hypocritical and not open-minded. Further, Helper matter-of-factly refers to the Southerner as backward, using statistics and other rhetoric to 'prove' that the South is backwards. Both documents point to the fact that slavery is evil and that Southerners must stop their "continual blushing" by sanctifying slavery while pointing to their agricultural superiority as the main need for it.
Hammond and Fitzhugh, on the other hand, defend the South and even make claims that the South is superior. Of course, both sides felt that the "Creator" is with them. However, the latter documents accuse the North of fake piety, of exaggerated claims of riots, etcetera. Here, the North is seen as a "wolf" (p. 34) who preys on the tranquility of the South. I laughed when I read that the only thing causing a mob in the South is an abolitionist, though I doubt it to be wholly true (p. 34). However, the idyllic picture Fitzhugh paints was only in terms of whites, not inclusive of the slaves who raised the South up (literally) on their backs. Yet, one can feel the passion in which they argue the South's cause.
Debow's documents circles the debate utilizing Southern non-slaveholders in his attempt to persuade them to support slavery. Here, he outlines five reasons using economic profit as his basis for supporting slavery. I was surprised (but should not have been) when he refers to slaves as commodities which produce human capital in reason four. This is important, as Schwalm maintains, because women were both productive in slavery and their reproductive capabilities made them assets to the Southerner.
Documents six and seven give opposing views of abolitionists, which furthered my understanding of each side's viewpoints. The rhetoric abolitionists used was impressive because they loaded journals with words such as "man-stealer," "social crime," "merchandise," etc. together with religion to convince that slave-holding is really "heathenism" disguised as other things (p. 38/39). If abolitionists exposed slavery for what it was, Southerners claimed abolitionists themselves were the cause of slaves suffering. Their writings, too, must have convinced many that the South's cause was justified; that indeed, abolitionists were meddlers. That is, he writes that most masters were benevolent!, but that abolitionists' caused masters to sell slaves to "hard-hearted" traders, thereby "increasing the suffering" of slaves (p. 40). The propaganda seen the collective arguements offer many reasons for each side's cause, but the one thing shared was that slavery was the underpinning of all arguements between the N/S.
The last two essays (written by modern historians) offer new ways of looking at the same issue. McPherson's essay shows the flaws in past/present scholarship by questioning how different/similar the South and North were, concluding that although there was a dichotomy, the South was most similar to other European countries. Deyle's essay focused more on how the slave trade entrenched each side in their differences. I enjoyed how each scholar deeply researched his point, and although the essays were different, each points to the glaring, unavoidable fact that the North and the South were dissimilar.It seems that war was inescaple the more time wore on and states were added.
Last but Not Least...A Hard Fight for We
Although I learned so much more than I thought possible via these primary documents, the focus in Schwalm's Hard Fight on gender in lowland rice plantations left me speechless. Turning page after page, the attention given to South Carolina's female slaves, their roles in the slave & white community, and so forth was phenomenal in its' scholarship and left me wondering how much of this has been previously "ignored" or glossed over by past scholars. If we are to be historians, we cannot ignore that social and reproductive labor contributed to/were the heart of those plantations. There were facts most people do not know (overseers, not just owners of plantations, routinely abused these women) and facts that have been passed up in history (the significance, for example, of their roles on/off the fields). I also appreciated the explication of what the work entailed and its' technical aspects (one could almost "see" the conditions under which they labored & the instruments used in which seasons). Schwalm's book fills-in-the-blanks of a time and gender which has previously been a postscript, at best. I cannot wait to write about this book!
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