Chapter Six: Perman and Taylor/Chapter Eleven: M&H (Why They Fought)
I thought to combine these readings because they inform one another as to the various reasons why volunteer soldiers fought in a war which would end later than most people predicted. There is so much information available through primary articles, diaries, and letters, that modern readers get a clear picture of the many reasons soldiers from the North and South sought to defend their cause. For some on both sides, it was patriotism. Though both sides differed as to what our forefathers meant when they invoked liberty, each side was certain they were upholding the original principals of 1776. For some Southerners, the fight was about subjugation, states rights, protecting slavery, property, self-government, honor, and/or duty. For some Northerners, the fight was about "the need to destroy slavery" (P&T, p. 178), duty, honor, Union rights, brotherhood, the need for the survival of a republican governement, and so on. No matter why they fought, Perman and Taylor's letters from men on both sides leave no doubt that the war had a huge impact on the men's pschological and physical well-being. Periods of no fighting were boring or intolerable, the men's morale hung in the balance, too many questions were unanswered (what was to be done with escaped slaves, for example), and both sides seemingly seperated race from slavery. Some Northerners echoed the sentiments of the Southerners, in that they cared less about what happened to the slaves than themselves. All of the letters are filled with a mixture of war words, hope, dread, longing, confusion, and doubt. One letter, written by Tally Simpson from the CSA, could have well been written by a Northerner when he states that the Battle at Vicksburg has caused him to "lose confidence in something or somebody, I can't say which." This was striking because every loss meant that the loss of confidence in the war itself, the men who led, and/or the privates fighting to make gains.
The Essays
Dean's essay on Confederate soldier enlistment patterns in Va. also informed my understanding of McPherson and Hogue's discussion on enlistment. In Va., for example, two party politics divided a state into Pro-Confederacy or Pro-Union. Geographical and industrial limitations or advantages like railroads and waterways were important stategically because they could be used to "strike" in those "vital" areas (M&H, p. 175). Dean's essay on enlistment of soldiers highlights each region's importance and high rate of enlistment "across a diverse array of communities in spite of the sharp regional divisions that had prevailed before the war" (P&T, p. 189). Here, Dean gives us the idea that pro-slavery conscription was highest in areas where there was a profit to be made. He goes on to illustrate the reason for secession, including ideology, religion, socio-economic status, and honor/shame culture. Both slaveholders and non-slaveholders in Va. enjoyed a certain status which they intended to keep/fight for, "hence, defending Virginia in 1860 was defending slavery" (p. 195). Rhetoric complicated and "prolonged" the war further, as "proslavery propagandists" framed arguments abstractly (p. 196). Enlistment patterns here speak loudly as to the real reasons folks volunteered for the war, not only in Va. but in the deep South as well.
Chandra Manning's essay on White Union Soldiers and their ideas about race and slavery was also eye-opening, to say the least. Here, she maintains that some Union soldiers were anti-slavery only because they wanted to "end the institution that they identified as the root cause of the conflict" (P&T, p. 199). Views on slavery ranged greatly, and as the author confirms, and it is difficult to know why because so many fought on the Union side and disagreed about almost everything (P&T, p. 200). However, research indicates that the earliest reasons had to do with protecting the republican governement. far from abolitionists, Union soldiers began to understand that the the peculiar institution that caused the war was also the one which needed to be abolished in order to end the war (P&T, p. 202). If any reader has romanticized notions about the North, Manning dispels them in her use of the soldier's own words. However, some (such as the Chaplain she quotes on p. 202) saw the folly of slavery in terms of class status and gender. I was also happy to read that popular literature also helped the abolitionist's cause. For one moment, I could not help cast aside the hat of historian for that of mother, and wept when I read about the inhumanity (p. 203) Webber encountered when he and friends met a boy whose "shoulders were black and blue" and couldn't raise his arm. No wonder, when confronted with such scenes, some (like Webber) could not turn away from the cruelty of slavery. manning writes that slavery "violated family rights" as well as other "sacred ideals" (p. 203). This happened with African-american soldier enlistment as well; Pro-union soldiers began to understand that black men could fight alongside and as well as they could. Of course, it was but a small change, since it did not mean soldiers were going to fight for racial equality or rights. Her ending is also a fitting explanation for "the aftermath of reconstruction," in which there was "a vast potential for racial change" which was unfullfilled (p. 209).
McPherson and Hogue (Chapters 10-13)
Chapter 10, as discussed earlier, was more than about geographical and regional differnces; it is discussed in the book as a "Brother's War" where whole families were divided between the North and the South. People who lived in the border states fought neighbor against neighbor, brother against brother. Public proclamations by Lincoln, disregard for orders and lack of supplies were only some of the problems faced by these states. Chapter 11 discusses the organization of the forces and the navies. Confederate navies were only well-versed in their waterways but lacked the knowledge of the sea and supplies (ships, ship engines) produced in the North. They may have had West Point graduates, but the North's Navy was in better shape. No one, as mentioned, thought the war would be long, except for Sherman. Tragic mix-ups with uniforms and lack/quality of supplies further plagued each side p. 181).
The sub-section on army organization was helpful because it included a diagram together with examples of what soldiers in each division did. There were so many casualites, that most companies were reduced to only fractions of their original numbers. The discussion on professionals vs. nonprofessionals was vital to understanding fractions within same regiments. Finally, the discussion on blockades showed that the South was crippled in some ways by "cargo" that would have "gotten through had there been no blockade" (p. 198). Chapter Twelve, "The Balance Sheet of War," gives the reader a glimpse as to how each side financed this expensive war. conscription began to suffer as morale declined, but was crucial to the South because without a draft, the South would have lost sooner (p. 203). A good point M&H make on page 204 was that the South only needed to defend from, not invade, the North. In other words, the burden of proof was on the North, The South knew their terrain better and maps of such areas were scarce for the Union. M&H also write about guerillas and state that less than 10,000 men served as such. Violence increased greatly because of guerillas - not a romantic notion! The Confederacy seemed in as bad shape financially as the North, although the North created "Greenbacks" or teasury notes to help finance the war along with War Bonds. Chapter 13 treats the topic of the war from both the homefront and abroad in Europe. The first Battle of Bull run was a bumbled success for the Union, in which Jackson was killed and the popular legend arose. Lincoln ordered them to attack even though they were "green," which caused elays and confusion among the troops. Spies foiled some of the plans and confusion about uniforms caused crippling of Union attacks (p. 229). Later, this battle became an expensive, "tactical victory for the Confederacy" (p. 230). This caused the South to think the war had been won, but McClellan came into the Union picture to organize what was left of the army. However, his ego large and his tendency to not act when important placed him in a tight spot for all the adulation he received. Equally, he wanted to dodge the question of "the Negro" and saw the war as a need to keep "the integrity" of the Union (p. 236). Last, I was surprised to learn that the Confederacy did not elicit help from other nations, as they thought previously would occur. There were several reasons for this, but the biggest seemd to be national self-interest, not ideology or politics (p. 238). The South thought blockading cotton from GB would enlist their help, but they were wrong because the Brits developed alternative solutions and would not be economically blackmailed (p. 239). The last topic, The Trent Affair, was the only skirmish between GB and the Union, but ended in a check-mate of sorts as either side realized one war was enough for the moment.
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