Generalship: How They Fought

Perman and Taylor Documents (Informed by M&H Readings)
The letters and essays in these readings taught me many things, and chief among them was that war is never the straight-forward, General Lee-vs.-General Grant war that most people romanticize even today. If soldiers faced sad and demoralizing circumstances, Generals felt the heavy burden/consequences of action or retreat, the fist-shaking (in some cases) of the citizens within their regions, and sometimes the discord between (especially for McClellan and Lincoln and Davis and Beauregard) their superiors, inferiors and each other.

Informed by M&H's Ordeal by Fire, each document reinforced the aforementioned - namely, that general theories are just that - they do not always add up in a straight-forward manner. For example, McClellan's letter to Lincoln in Document 1 illustrates how McClellan almost tells the President what to do. Indeed, his manner is condescending. He corretly says that this "rebellion" is now a "war," but regards himself somewhat the authority on strategy (p. 140-141). The end of the letter is ironic (almost hypocritical) because after telling him what to do, McClellan places himself as the humble servant. In some instances (as in Va.) General McClellan does quite the opposite of what is needed - he retreats rather than being someone who "is competent to execute your orders..." (p. 141).

Document 2 is one in which General Lee congratulates his army in The Seven Days Battle also mentioned in M&H. The weather may have been bad (M&H, p. 266), but Lee was no pushover. While McClellan complained of no reinforcement and retreated rather than attacked, Lee was in pursuit of "the flying foe" (p. 142, P&T). Gen. Lee gives credit to the Union, but knew how to strategize during that time. On the other hand, while he commends his troops, he knows that "The service rendered to the country ..." and its' "brilliant results have cost us many brave men" (p. 142, P&T). Sadly, his next-to-last paragraph is powerful in that it was and continues to be a war "that will live forever in the hearts of people" (p. 142). One only need to see modern-day, Civil War reenactments to know how many died on both sides for the Generals who thought (as McClellan and Lee did) that each had Christianity on his side.

Document 3 is Lee's letter to President Davis in lieu of "the Opportunity to Invade Maryland" (p. 143, P&H). This letter highlights Lee's strategies and his lamentation of not having enough "munitions" (p. 143). Even without the necessaries, Lee felt he could not stand by and let the enemy rise against them.
He further shows hope that "success" is not "impossible," despite the hard luck of the Confederate army. His letter is in contrast with McClellan's - to me less haughty (though I don't like the fact that the South cared so much about protecting slavery). He does not refer to slavery itself, but he does seem worried about having enough guns, as mentioned. Shoes were also a large concern, as the territory to be marched over was rough and going into Md. not easy.

Document 4 is Grant's Plans for The Overland campaign (USA). While the union had several victories (Chapter 14 of M&H) in 1862, by 1864 Grant was strategizing in his letter to Meade on how to defeat Lee and the E/W plan (smartly so because of the rail lines and diverting from the typical N/S plans). He seemed to anticipate what the rebels would do to try to "force" their way in (p. 145). Though the letter is an outline, he writes that he will "talk over with you more fully than I can write them" his "objections and advantages" (p. 145). Though Grant had had some failures (the pause in Ft. Donelson, M&H), he also had the advantage of reinforcements and cutting off enemy supply in this campaign. Gen. Grant's plan was also to reduce "baggage" and attack (contrasting w/McClellan's "retreat" mode) (P&T p. 146, M&H). Perhaps, as in the essays that followed, grant really hasn't been given his due in history.

Document 5 reveals Grant's thoughts on the aforementioned campaign two years later. He calls the campaign "memorable" in that it could not be "accomplished, however, without as desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed" (p. 146). Grant also never seemed to underestimate the enemy, whether at The Battle of Shiloh (M&H, p. 247-8) or two years later during this campaign. He strategized but also anticipated correctly. The letter to me divulges a sad, scared (for lack of a better term) Grant: The enemy almost making their "boast good" and the "carnage" on both sides with heavy loss underscored in this letter (p. 146).

Document 6 is Sherman's "angry letter" (intro.) to Atlanta's mayor. This one was very interesting because it is also later in the war, after Union "Triumphs in the West" (p. 251, M&H) and the Union seems stronger than before. After Jackson and Lee's victories in Va. and Lee being called "audacious," Sherman was also no easy target, according to this letter (p. 257, M&H, P&T, p. 147). His letter is an angry response to the mayor after asking for the evacuation of his citizens, and he is just as decisive as any other Gen. "We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all America" he writes in one  striking moment on page 147. He details the chain of events which necessitate to receive the peace sought for all citizens as well. However, he doesn't underestimate the enemy and lets the mayor know it is up to him to prepare his people and "make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away" (p. 147). He calls the war cruel in the same letter and makes my point that to be a Gen. is hard: "I will make more sacrifices than..any of you to secure peace" (p. 147). He also refers to national feeling, and goes on to rebuke the mayor in saying the US wants nothing of their property, "negroes," or land, but demands "obediance" to the law of the nation (p. 148). I thought his last three paragraphs were more forceful than the first because he puts the fault of war back onto the South and pretty much tells them what must be done to obtain peace.

Document 7 is Grant's report to Stanton on his achievements since his appointment. Grant minces no words in explaining each side's vulnerabilities and strengths. Grant knew the CSA was outnumbered in troops (p. 149) and acknowledges that the Union made costly mistakes. His defense was to use many troops and "hammer continously" the enemy to submission not to him, but to "the constitution" and "the law of the land" (p. 149). His last paragraph rung truthfully and powerfully when he writes that the people who suffered the most will decide whether his actions were properly executed (p. 149). It is easy to see he was as burdened as any other Gen. when he writes in closing that he did all he did in good faith and "conscientiously" (p. 149). I felt empathy that the cost of war was felt so deeply by the men who were ultimately blamed/praised for their respective failures and successes. no one has it harder than the guy who takes all the guilt and sleeps as little as - or less than - his men.

The last two documents are essays which deal which the Va. "Seven Days" and Overland campaigns. In the first essay, Gallagher writes about "how each side fought" (intro.) and how the Confederate army "changed the course of war" (p. 149). Chapter 15 of M&H also deals with this very important topic taking placein 1862. McClellan's hesitation seems to be a topic brought up again and again in both books. Gallagher examines this campaign in a different way than the traditional "gauging consequences" and "examining casualties" (p. 150). Although M&H offer a detailed review, his take on this is interesting because he offers insight into "the larger picture" (p. 150). Small pieces taken together, he offers, provide a clearer picture of what happened in Va. and why it was important. Richmond was crucial, as both books point out, because of its location and what it meant in terms of emancipation, outcome, and so forth. He also treats the topic of newspapers and how the contributed to sentiment during that time - "Sentiment in the South contrasted sharply with that in the North," he writes on page 154. The essay also deals with morale, the lack of a comander in the South, how McClellan treated the war, why Lee was successful, and so on. The end of his essay leaves us to consider the "full context" of the campaing and its "immediate and long-range influence" (p. 161).

The last essay is written by Grimsley and speaks to the meaning of the Overland Campaign and the myth of Gen. Lee vs. Grant. The campaign was bloody.When he writes "So much broken humanity, and for what?" in his assessment, I felt sad because it holds true even today. Grant was portrayed as a butcher by many in his camp and otherwise, casualties were high, but the author also writes about Lee's defense as a "masterpiece" (p. 164). The author shows here that no matter which way the cookie crumbles, it wasn't a Lee vs. Grant contest; it was also about their subordinates and each man's style of "control" or "coping" (p. 167). The end of the essay echoes what M&H write about Grant having an unfair image (p. 171). The last two pages refer mostly to the "myth" of those Gen.'s propagated even by today's scholars. Though he writes more objectively than I have seen in other works, the author also defends Grant as "often poorly served" on p. 165. He devotes the rest of the essay to dispelling those myths and writes that "if we need the myth of Lee, so too perhaps do we need the countermyth of Grant" (p. 165).

Both Books

Reading about the different generals in relation to their strategies, soldiers and campaigns gave me a richer, deeper, sadder sense of what it took in human lives to win this war that started out - presumably-- being not about slavery, being about state rights, etc. The Generals had first-hand experience not only in Va., but in Shiloh, Manassas, The Battle of Bull Run and many others. It is difficult to read about the Civil War and not feel for the men who had to strategize, prevent, be criticized, be responsible and ultimately win or lose the war. I hope we never have to deal with this again, a brother's war with no end in sight until so many more are lost than lived. We may have Vietnam and 911, but sometimes we are our own worst enemies.